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Australia recently introduced a revised ‘economic’ objective to its Fisheries Management 
Act that has given greater focus to the economic performance of Australian fisheries 
management.  Specifically, the objective requires the Australian Fisheries Management 
Authority (AFMA) to pursue maximising net economic returns to the Australian 
community from Commonwealth fishery resources when making fishery management 
decisions.  The technical challenge is how to measure AFMA’s performance in pursuing 
this objective.  Separation of all other factors that influence fishing industry returns from 
decisions made by AFMA is the first step.  Alternative economic analyses to achieving 
this are considered.  The policy challenge is to gain industry acceptance that AFMA has a 
role in managing for both biological and economic sustainability that can benefit the 
industry and the Australian public.  The role and views of AFMA, its Management 
Advisory Committees (MACs), Resource Assessment Groups (RAGs) and industry 
associations in this process are explored.   Two fisheries are discussed as examples of 
applying fishery economic performance measures, the Northern Prawn Fishery and the 





In 2005 AFMA’s economic objective was changed by government from ‘maximising the 
economic efficiency of Australian fisheries’ to ‘maximising the net economic returns to 
the Australian community from the management of Australian fisheries’.  At the time 
government stated that the new objective was simply a clarification of the old objective.  
However, closer reading of it suggests much greater scrutiny on AFMA and its decision 
making, particularly how its decisions are contributing to the economic performance of 
Australian fisheries. 
 
Since mid 2006 AFMA has commenced a process of learning and development to 
understand and implement the new economic objective in partnership with its 
stakeholders and consistent with ABARE’s performance reporting on Commonwealth 
fisheries.  This paper provides a short of history, progress to date and what the next steps 
are in 2007. 
 
Commonwealth fisheries economics in context 
In the mid 1990s several court cases were heard that brought into focus AFMA’s 
economic efficiency objective defining it as applying at a fishery scale (and not an individual fisher), being one of a number of objectives that must be pursued in tandem 
and in some instances being the most important (see Bannister Quest Pty Ltd v AFMA, 
1997 & PW Adams v AFMA, 1996). Following this initial focus the objective faded from 
the fisheries management arena for almost a decade. 
 
Its re-emergence was brought about through the development and release the first 
Ministerial Direction to AFMA in December 2005.  This is a statutory instrument under 
s.91 of the Fisheries Administration Act 1991. The Direction set out the risks government 
was willing to take in the utilization of Commonwealth fisheries resources, thus filling a 
policy gap that had existed since AFMA’s inception.  It also placed maximum economic 
yield (MEY) firmly on the map as a target reference point for Commonwealth fish stocks.  
The Direction’s release occurred only a few weeks after the new economic objective was 
announced by government. 
 
Economic objectives and expectations 
The government, in releasing the new economic objective, stated that AFMA must:  
-  produce the greatest individual and thus fishery-wide net economic returns 
through effective fishery management 
-  use total allowable catches (TACs) and individual transferable quotas (ITQs) 
as the primary management tool 
-  provide on-going benefits from the $220M industry restructure through its 
management decisions 
-  prevent overfishing and recover overfished stocks 
-  pursue sustainable and profitable fisheries. 
 
The economic objective combined with these statements placed a clear need for AFMA 
to measure the impacts of its decisions on the economic performance of fisheries.  This is 
distinguishable from the general economic performance of a fishery which is primarily 
driven by external forces, such as diesel and seafood commodity prices. 
 
So far the industry has had little involvement in the above debate, however this will 
change in 2007 as AFMA tests its preferred approach to measuring its economic 
performance in a number of fisheries.  It is unclear at present how industry will react but 
historically it has regarded fishery economics as largely its business.  Most in industry 
have simply assumed based on government advice that the old and new objectives are 
essentially the same and therefore no additional action by AFMA is required. 
 
Options for measuring economic performance 
AFMA worked closely with ANU and ABARE in considering what options would best 
suit its fisheries with the criteria being; a single approach applied to all fisheries and one 
that satisfies both AFMA and ABARE requirements.  Three options were short listed for 
consideration; MEY, profit decomposition and productivity indices.  These options were 
then looked at in terms of balancing need and cost, particularly regarding data. 
 
Following consideration of the above the AFMA Board has decided to proceed with a 
trial in five fisheries to undertake profit decomposition during 2007.  
Institutional issues 
AFMA consults with industry primarily through its management advisory committees 
(MACs) and resource assessment groups (RAGs), which are the advisory bodies that 
provide advice to the AFMA Board.  The Board in turn is able to, subject to its guiding 
legislation, make decisions on almost all fisheries management matters without reference 
to the Minister or other arms of government. 
 
A key matter facing AFMA was a lack of economic capacity and training.  Previous 
experience with MACs and RAGs in the area of stock assessment demonstrated that 
AFMA staff and industry participants require some base level understanding of the 
science in order interpret and make informed recommendations to the AFMA Board.  
Therefore in order to implement economic performance reporting through the MACs and 
RAGs AFMA staff and industry participants need to be conversant with economic 
principles. 
 
To address this need, AFMA formed a fisheries economics working group of about 10 
staff to learn about fisheries economics and measuring economic performance which was 
facilitated by the ANU.  This process is being followed by an economics workshop to 
bring in other economists, relevant agencies and industry principals.  However, it is clear 
that a more enduring program is required to embed fisheries economics in the fisheries 
management decision making process.  This could parallel the process funded for stock 
assessment in the 1990’s by the FRDC. 
 
AFMA faces a real challenge in gaining the understanding and support of MACs and 
RAGs for economic performance reporting, but this is necessary to meet government 
reporting requirements and pursuing the objectives of the Act.  This process will 
commence in the second quarter of 2007 in conjunction with planned MAC and RAG 
meetings.  ANU economists who developed the profit decomposition approach will 
facilitate these discussions. 
 
Current use of MEY in AFMA fisheries 
Up until 2006 only one fishery, the Northern Prawn Fishery (NPF), had a specific 
economic objective - managing the prawn harvest at MEY.  Tiger and endeavour prawns 
have had a MEY target calculated. 
 
The NPF is an input controlled fishery with fishing effort measured by head-rope length.  
As with many input controlled fisheries there is periodic reduction in head-rope length to 
deal with effort creep (estimated at 3-5% pa).  Historically the NPF has made sufficient 
profits to self-fund adjustment.  More recently (2003-2006), with low prawn prices due to 
import competition (prawns produced by aquaculture in Asia) and high fuel prices, there 
is little or no profit being made by the industry.  In 2006 the government agreed to buy 
out a proportion of NPF fishing concessions (vessel and gear) in return for industry 
agreeing to move to TAC/ITQ management.  The buyout was completed in February 
2007 (reducing the fleet from 95 to 52 boats) and the NPF will move to TAC/ITQ’s by 
2010.  The government’s expectation is that by aligning fishing capacity with that required to achieve MEY and implementing an output control system the fishery is best 
placed to self adjust (through the quota market) and make profits in the future.  However, 
despite having agreed to move to TAC/ITQ management and accepting about $50M in 
buy-back funds, many industry members doubt the use of output based management 
making implementation challenging for managers. 
 
Notwithstanding the above a bio-economic model based around MEY has been 
constructed and applied to the NPF.  This provides forward projections for up to five 
years.  The biggest issue facing the fishery is that current stock size (for tiger prawns – 
the primary species) is less than MSY and MEY is 1.5 x MSY.  It may be that any TAC 
is considerably less than current catch levels under the effort control system. 
 
A second fishery, the Southern and Eastern Scalefish and Shark Fishery (SESSF), had 
MEY analyses applied to several key species in mid 2006.  These were flathead, pink 
ling, spotted (silver) warehou, orange roughy and blue grenadier.  For each species MEY 
was greater than MSY, although this varied between 1.03 for flathead and 1.47 for 
Cascade Plateua orange roughy.  This gave further weight to the claim that no matter 
what the species MEY was at least as conservative, if not more so, than MSY.  The 
relationship between MSY and MEY is considered further in the harvest strategy section 
(below). 
 
A third application of MEY was to the newly developing albacore stock adjacent to 
Queensland.  Until 2005 albacore had been a bycatch of target fishing for yellowfin and 
big-eye tuna in the Eastern Tuna and Billfish Fishery (ETBF), and effort controlled 
fishery.  During 2005 several vessels switched to deep setting with longlines for albacore 
and by 2006 12-15 were doing so.  Profits were being generated through improved 
international prices for frozen and fresh albacore, and the byproduct of high quality big-
eye and yellow fin.  In 2006, AFMA faced a situation where up to 60 vessels could fish in 
the albacore fishery with no limit on catch.  Rather than just apply a TAC to ensure 
sustainability AFMA wanted to maximize the profits from the albacore fleet for the 
longer term.  This meant maintaining catch rates and sizes classes at profitable levels. 
 
A MEY model was constructed for the fishery in the latter half of 2006 and showed that a 
TAC of around 3,200 tonnes and up to 15 vessels was the best mix to achieve MEY.  
AFMA has now implemented the TAC and is working with Eastern Tuna MAC on the 
best means of matching fleet capacity to MEY.   
 
The Ministerial Direction and Economic Performance 
As noted above, in December 2005 AFMA was given a statutory Direction from the 
Minister for Fisheries and Conservation which focused on ending overfishing and 
recovering overfished stocks.  It also required AFMA to apply an interim harvest strategy 
policy (HSP) based around MEY.  The interim HSP expressed the risk the government 
was willing to take in the utilization of publicly owned fisheries in waters where 
Commonwealth law applied.  This was a major step forward for AFMA and industry as it 
placed boundaries around decisions on catch levels in particular which had previously been absent.  The draft final HSP will be released for public comment in March 2007 and 
implemented by 1 January 2008.   
 
AFMA is aware that for many fish stocks or fisheries estimating MEY may be too 
expensive (due to data needs and interpretation skills) given the small size of several 
fisheries.  Because of this the draft HSP provides for proxies for MEY (1.2xMSY) and 
MSY.   In order to ensure the same level of risk is being taken with a fish-stock across 
varying levels of uncertainty ‘tiers’ were established from fully quantitative assessments 
(Tier 1) to fully qualitative ones (Tier 4).  The lower the tier a fish stock is in the more 
conservative the management to maintain the same level of risk.  
 
Conclusion 
Changes to AFMA’s economic objective, the Ministerial Direction and the Australian 
government’s structural adjustment package in late 2005 have placed greater focus on 
AFMA’s economic objective, the Authority’s performance and its decision making.  The 
economic performance of Commonwealth fisheries is being monitored by ABARE and it 
is important that AFMA and ABARE agree on what tools will be used in future.  Further, 
distinguishing the economic impact of AFMA’s decision making from all the other 
factors that influence vessel and fleet profitability is needed.  One approach is to use 
profit decomposition and this will be trialed in 2007 to see if it is the best means of doing 
so across five of AFMA’s fisheries.  If successful, in the last quarter of 2007 the AFMA 
Board will consider its implementation as general economic reporting tool for AFMA.  
 
 